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Abstract
This paper develops a three periods OLG growth model where agents
accumulate human capital in the first period (benefiting from grandfathers
savings, public expenditure in education, and human capital
level of their parents), work and save in the second period (earning a
salary proportional to the human capital level accumulated), and retire in
the thid period, leaving bequest on for the young generation. Gov-
ernment raises taxes on labour and capital in order to finance public ex-
penditure in education. We derive conditions for equilibrium and for the
rate of growth, and then carry out welfare analysis in order to determine
optimal taxation in a Nash policy setting.
JEL classification: H30, H52, H21
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1 Introduction
This paper intends to contribute to the literature on optimal fiscal policy in
economic growth by enriching the microfounded model underneath. In order to
do so, we borrow and modify the framework from an apparently distant field, the
literature on overlapping generation models with human capital accumulation
and intergenerational transfer.The idea is to enrich the microfoundations of the
model with more realistical features, such as the financing of education by older
generations’lifetime savings, and the inclusion of taxation on both production
factors, whose revenue is used by the government to raise the marginal utility
of private investment in education1 As a result of the welfare analysis, optimal
tax rates on labour and capital are no longer zero (as in much of endogenous
growth theory), and quantitative simulations lead to plausible values.
2 Review of the Literature
The importance of education and human capital in economic growth has been
supported by a number of valuable contributions, starting from Romer (1986),
Lucas (1988) and Barro, Sala-i-Martin (1995); all of them establish the fact
that human capital accumulation is a major engine of long-run growth (for a
good discussion on the issue, see Temple (1999,2000)). This represent the first,
and fundamental, line of research which is relevant for the scope of the present
paper.
A second line of research, instead, explores in depth the link between endoge-
nous growth and human capital accumulation fully microfounded models with
intergenerational links and schooling, and often in general equilibrium. Glomm
and Ravikumar (1992) seems to be the first contribution in this stream; they
present an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents in which
human capital investment through schooling in the engine of growth; they ana-
lyze the evolution of growth and inequality (the latter is made possible by the
assumption of lognormal distribution of initial skills) under both a public and
private education scheme: in the former, investment in the quality of education
is made through majority voting, whereas in the latter each household is free
to choose (i.e. to buy) the quality of education she prefers. They conclude that
public education reduces income inequality more quickly than private education,
but private education yields higher per capita incomes (unless the initial income
inequality is suﬃciently large). Although this is not a general equilibrium model
(there is no production), it is the first consistent and relevant attempt to address
the issue of growth starting from a microfounded OLG model with intergener-
ational altruism (in fact, fathers care about the level of education achieved by
their children); moreover, the analysis is enriched by the introduction of hetero-
geneity of agents, a feature that has not been so common in the later literature (
1This can be more broadly interpreted as public investment in education.
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a similar analysis is conducted by Zhang 1996, who achieves not-so-diﬀerent re-
sults in analysing the choice between provinding public education or subsidizing
private one).
In an extension of their work, ten years later, Glomm and Ravikumar (2003)
retain most of their previous framework, but focus on how an economy with
public education behaves over time under diﬀerent funding levels. In order to do
so in a proper way, they abandon the logarithmic preferences and Cobb-Douglas
technology forms (previously assumed for tractability) and use CRRA utility
function and non-restricted human capital accumulation equations. As a result,
time allocated to learning is no longer constant, and it is instead a non-trivial
function of parental human capital and public expenditure on education, so that
there are richer eﬀects on distribution; the insertion of a CRRA functional form
make the risk adversion parameter crucial, in comparision with the magnitude of
the parameter governing the importance of parental human capital, in determing
the convergence/ divergence: in one case, the growth rate of income is decreasing
in the level of income (i.e. lower income families grow faster), in the other is
increasing. They perform a set of simulation and conclude that the possibility
of divergence, at least in the short run, cannot be ruled out by the comparative
dynamics of the model, and thus public education may not always be the "great
equalizer" as intended by its proponents.
For a more complete assessment of the issue, Brauninger and Vidal (2000)
examines interactions between education policy and growth in a three periods-
OLG models with two types of individuals (skilled and unskilled) and no popula-
tion growth. Growth is determined by physical capital (with learning-by-doing)
and human capital; public education spending takes the form of a education
susbidy, who increases the proportion of skilled individuals (the choice of ed-
ucating or not is exogenous and discrete, and the degree of intergenerational
altruism is summarized by a i.i.d. random variable ). They conclude that there
are non-linear eﬀects of an increased public expenditure on growth, since the
design of the model (targeted at the eﬀect of education policy on skills and sav-
ing) generates at the macroeconomic level a trade-oﬀ between the two sources
of growth: on one hand, increasing the average level of skills in the economy
increases the eﬃciency of labour and it is good for growth, on the other educa-
tion expenditures crowd out saving and the formation of physical capital that
is the other engine of growth through the learning-by-doing eﬀect2. As a result,
inducing more people to educate their oﬀspring by increasing public education
expenditure may have the above-mentioned non-linear eﬀects on growth: start-
ing from a skilled trapped economy (i.e. an economy in which almost no one is
educated) harms growth and increases inequality: a former equal but unskilled
society becomes unequal as some families educate their children and at the same
time private education expenditures crowds out savings and results in a lower
growth. On the other hand, increasing the subsidy from a suﬃciently high level
of education promotes growth and reduces inequality: the society, in fact, be-
2This latter eﬀect is due to the fact that due to the increase in the public subsidy, some
of the unskilled partents now decide to educate their oﬀspring. These families now save less
and there is, thus, a negative eﬀect on the growth rate.
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comes more equal as almost all individuals are skilled, and the adverse eﬀect on
savings is low as the increase in private education expenditures associated with
a high level of the subsidy is moderate. These results conform with the stylized
fact that more equal societies grow faster than unequal ones (see Persson and
Tabellini 1994). It is important, for our scopes, to note that in this framework
they assume non-distorsionary taxation (the specific focus being the trade oﬀ
between resources devoted to savings and education).
Blankenau and Simpson (2004), instead, explore the link between public
education and growth in a similar framework (three periods-OLG general equi-
librium model) but inserting distorsionary taxation. They build a model with
homogenous agents in which human capital evolves according to private input,
parental human capital and public expenditure on education, the latter being
financed by taxation on consumption, on wage income and on capital in ad-
diction to non-distorsionary taxation. They solve the model in steady-state
and carry out a number of simulations by increasing the public expenditure
on education but varying the source of financing, and conclude that the direct
eﬀect of this policy is an increase in the steady-state growth rate, but general
equilibrium adjustments in other factors that aﬀect growth may act in the op-
posite direction. Moreover, there are significant diﬀerences in this crowding-out
process depending on whether the source of financing is mainly distorsionary
or rather non-distorsionary taxation. In their opinion, these considerations can
help explaining the nonmonotonic nature of the relationship public expenditure
on education - growth3, and can trigger a more cohmprensive analysis on how
appropriate tax policies can help turn government education spending into a
more eﬃcient engine of growth.
A good contribution to the issue of eﬀectiveness and financial sustainabil-
ity of public policy when human capital accumulation process is specifically
taken into account, comes from Glomm and Kaganovich (2003), who enriche
the framework by studying the provision of public education in conjunction with
the existence of a pension systems. The general equilibrium model focuses on
the dynamic distributional eﬀects of raising funding levels for public education
in the presence of pay-as-you-go social security system, in a two-periods OLG
economy with heterogenous agents and in which the government runs both pro-
grammes (education and pensions). Both public policy are financed by taxation
on labour income but at diﬀerent tax rates, and while education expenditure
goes into human capital accumulation process (modelled in a similar fashion
as Glomm, Ravikumar 1992 and 2003), pensions are paid to the old, entering
second-period budget constraint. They study how an increase in the education
tax rate aﬀects the distribution of human capital in the economy, analysing the
diﬀerent co-movements of the two tax rates (namely, whether an increase in the
tax rate on education is balanced by an analogous decrease in the tax rate used
to finance pensions or rather the two fiscal policy instruments move indepen-
dently). From these interesting fiscal policy considerations, the main conclusion
3The fact that we cannot find a clear and unambigous empirical validation that increasing
public education expenditure also increases growth is one the major puzzle in this field.
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is the arising of the possibility that raising funding for public education may
generate higher inequality, since it may imply a reduction in social security,
which in turn distorts the agents’ incentives to invest private resources into the
education of their children.
A third line of research focuses on the optimal taxation of human and phys-
ical capital in (neoclassical or endogenous) growth models. In the standard
neoclassical growth model, where physical capital is the only factor that can be
accumulated, the normative implication is that the optimal long-run tax on cap-
ital income should be zero, while the optimal tax rate on labour income should
be positive4 (Judd (1985, 1995), Chamley (1986), Diamond (1973)). As far as
endogenous growth models are concerned, traditional literature (Bull (1993),
Jones et al (1993,1997)) shows that optimal tax on both capital and labour in-
come should be zero. Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998) confirm this result in
a three-sector general equilibrium endogenous growth model in continuos time
where human capital accumulation depends also on physical as well as human
capital, and when leisure is treated in a more sophisticated fashion (as a proper
production sector). However, in this stream of literature (more resembling the
first one we mentioned in this review), public expenditure takes the form of an
exogenously-given path who does not enter the human capital production, and
there is no kind of overlapping generations framework with intergenerational
altruism and/or transfer.
At this point, the scope of the present paper are fairly clear. We intend to
analyse the relationship between human capital accumulation and growth (first
line of research above mentioned) using an OLG framework with intergenera-
tional links (second line) with particular regard to tax policy and its eﬀects on
growth (third line).
3 The model
In order to do so, we innovate on the previous frameworks (mainly referring
to the second line of literature) by building a two-period OLG model with
intergenerational altruism and monetary bequest from the old generation to the
young, which is directed to human capital formation.
3.1 Households
Households maximize the following utility function:
Ut = ln ct,t + β ln ct,t+1 + γ lnht+1 (1)
where:
4The underlying reason is that the distorsion created by capital income taxation is more
severe: in fact, by reducing the return to savings, it taxes future consumption at an increasing
rate, thereby inducing an intertemporal distorsion. On the other hand, a labour income tax
aﬀects only the labour/leisure choice, which is an intratemporal distorsion.
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ct,t = consumption in period t
ct,t+1 =consumption in period t+ 1
ht+1 = level of human capital of his oﬀspring
0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, and γ > 0 measures the degree of altruism,
telling us how much the agent cares about his childrens’education5.
In period t, the consumer works (earning a wage proportional to her human
capital level) and divides her net disposable income across consumption and
savings. The corresponding period budget constraint is therefore:
ct + st = (1− τw)wtht (2)
where:
st = savings
wtht = labour income (with wt the wage, and htthe human capital level)
τw =tax rate on labour
In period t + 1, the consumer receives yields on period t savings but pays
taxes on this financial income; then she divides the resulting net income across
consumption and savings, devoting the latter to the human capital accumulation
of the young, as bequest.
ct+1 + st+1 = (1 + (1− τk)r)st (3)
where:
r = interest rate
τk = taxation on capital income
Since population grows according to:
Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt (4)
Each "old" saves st+1 and gives it back to young people, so that the per-
capite variable is st+1(1+n)2
Human capital evolves according to:
ht+1 =
st+1
(1 + n)2
Eµh1−µt (5)
where:
5Here altruism is introduced (as in Glomm and Kaganovich 2002) via the inclusion of the
childrens’achievements in terms of human capital level, which is directly linked to children’s
utility since the more they study, the more they earn and hence the more they can consume. In
the literature, bequest motive has assumed the form of childrens’income (Brauninger and Vidal
2000), the quality of childrens’education (Glomm and Ravikumar 2000), or childrens’utility
(Zhang 1996).
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Et = public expenditure on education
ht =parental human capital
st+1
(1+n)2 = private input to education
The related literature has always assumed a similar specification for the
learning technology. Regarding the arguments of the function, whereas there is
common consensus on the importance of public expenditure6 and of parental
human capital7, many have focused on time devoted to learning (Glomm and
Ravikumar (2002,2003),(Blankenau andSimpson (2004)) rather than physical
resources in monetary terms8. Regarding the functional form, specifications
vary only in terms of the degree of homogeneity of (5), establishing degree one
(and thus constant returns to scale, as in Blankenau and Simpson (2004)), or
choosing not to restrict parameters (as in other studies). A notable exception in
both dimensions is the work of Galor et al.„ who assume an implicit functional
form ht+1 = f(et) where et is alternatively public funding of education (as in
Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2003) and Galor and Moav (2006)) or private funding
(Galor and Moav (2004))9.
Maximization problem is:
max
st,st+1
(1)
s.t.(2), (3), (5)
and it has to be solved via backward induction, following the temporal se-
quence in the reverse order: so first we maximize with respect to st+1, and then
with respect to st , to get the optimal combination of the two choice variables:
s∗t =
(β + γ)
1 + β + γ
(1− τw)wtht (6)
s∗t+1 =
γ
1 + β + γ
(1 + (1− τk)r))(1− τw)wtht (7)
Exploiting budget constraints (2) and (3) we can also get expressions for
optimal consumption in both periods:
ct =
µ
1
1 + β + γ
¶
(1− τw)wtht (8)
ct+1 =
β
1 + β + γ
(1 + (1− τk)r))(1− τw)wtht (9)
6For example, in OECD countries, public school enrollment exceeds 70 per cent
(source:OECD).
7See for example Coleman et al (1966) and Oreopoulos et al (2003).
8One relevant exception is Glomm and Kaganovich (2003), who adopt a specification in
which private and public funding, plus time devoted by parents to childrens’education, co-
exist.
9Galor et al analyze this issue in the context of a diﬀerent stream of research, regarding
the process of development and the class structure from Industrial Revolution onwards.
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Optimal accumulation of human capital results to be:
ht+1 =
γ
(1 + β + γ)
(1− τw)wtEµ(1 + (1− τk)r)) h2−µt (10)
3.2 Firms
Consistently with historical evidence (Goldin and Katz (1998)), the economy is
characterized by capital-skill complementarity:
Yt = AK
α
t H
1−α
t (11)
With the assumption of perfectly competitive markets:
r = α
Y
K
(12)
w = (1− α)Y
H
(13)
Production function in units of eﬃcient labour, calling yt = YtHt and kt =
Kt
Ht
,
is:
yt = Akαt (14)
And also:
r = αAkα−1t (15)
w = (1− α)Akα (16)
3.3 Government
Government raises taxes on wage and capital income and uses it to finance
public expenditure on education. Balanced budget constraint is assumed, so
that no deficit can arise:
Et = τwwtht + τkrkt (17)
Note that in the welfare analysis we will first analyse the simplest case, where
only taxation on labour exists.
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3.4 Growth
Growth is given by:
Yt+1
Yt
=
µ
Kt+1
Kt
¶αµHt+1
Ht
¶1−α
(18)
We assume that first-period savings go to capital formation, so st = kt; we
thus plug the equation for first-period optimal saving (6) into (18):
Yt+1
Yt
=
µ
wt+1
wt
¶αµht+1
ht
¶
(19)
Using the FOC for wages and simplifying:
Yt+1
Yt
=
Ã Yt+1
Ht+1
Yt
Ht
!αµ
ht+1
ht
¶
Yt+1
Yt
=
µ
Yt+1
Ht+1
Ht
Yt
¶αµht+1
ht
¶
µ
Yt+1
Yt
¶1−α
=
µ
ht+1
ht
¶1−α
(20)
Equation (20) tells us that the rate of growth of output is the same as
the rate of growth of human capital.
Let us now compute it, taking (5) and dividing by ht:
g =
ht+1
ht
=
st+1
(1 + n)2
Eµh−µt
Plugging in the expression for st+1 (7):
g =
γ
(1 + β + γ)(1 + n)2
(1 + (1− τk)r))(1− τw)wtEµh1−µt (21)
Equation (21) tells us that the rate of growth is positively aﬀected by:
- an increase in public expenditure in education (and its eﬃciency)
- the degree of altruism
and it is negatively aﬀected by:
- the increase in population
- taxation on labour and capital
3.5 Optimal taxation
This section is concerned with welfare analysis in order to define optimal tax-
ation. Since utility is logaritmic, in order to conduct welfare analysis we can
simply maximize the individual utility function with respect to the tax rates.
Let us first analyse the case with only one tax rate (on labour), and then insert
the one on capital income.
9
3.5.1 Welfare analysis with only one tax rate
Social planner problem is thus:
max
τ
Ut = ln ct,t + β ln ct,t+1 + γ lnht+1 (22)
s.t.
E = τWh
ct =
µ
1
1 + β + γ
¶
(1− τw)wtht
ct+1 =
β
1 + β + γ
(1 + r)(1− τw)wtht
ht+1 =
γ
(1 + β + γ)
(1− τw)wtEµ(1 + r) h2−µt
Making use of the firms FOC (12) and (13), and dragging along only the
terms in τ 10 ,we get to the following unconstrained maximization problem (de-
tails of the calculations can be found in Appendix A):
max
τ
U =
1
1− α ln(1−τ) +β
∙
α
1− α ln(1− τ)
¸
+γ
∙
1
1− α ln(1− τ) + µ ln τ + µ
α
1− α ln(1− τ)
¸
In the proceeding of the maximization, we distinguish three cases, according
to the assumption we make about β(the discount factor) and γ (the degree of
altruism):
- assuming β = γ = 1
- assuming β, γ 6= 1
- assuming β = 1 and γ 6= 1
3.5.2 Assuming β = γ = 1
Social planner problem becomes:
max
τ
2 ln(1− τ) + 3α
1− α ln(1− τ) + µ ln τ +
µα
1− α ln(1− τ) (23)
which leads to:
τ∗ =
µ(1− α)
α+ µ+ 2
(24)
10We can do this thanks to the assumption of logaritmic utility, which greatly simplifies the
calculations.
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Qualitative analysis: derivative analysis Derivative of (24)with respect
to µ
∂τ∗
∂µ
=
(1− α)(α+ 2)
(α+ µ+ 2)2
> 0 (25)
So ∂τ
∗
∂µ > 0, that is, raising the eﬃciency of public expenditure on education
raises the optimal tax rate.
Derivative of (24) with respect to α :
∂τ∗
∂α
= − µ(3 + µ)
(α+ µ+ 2)2
< 0 (26)
So, raising the share of output going to capital (=decreasing the share of
output going to human capital), decreases optimal tax rate.
Quantitative analysis :simulation of τ∗ holding α = 0.3 If we take for
granted the value that literature has traditionally assigned to α,we can carry
out a number of simulations varying the value of µ:
The table:⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
µ τ∗α=0.3
0.1 0.0250
0.2 0.0483
0.3 0.0700
0.4 0.0903
0.5 0.1094
0.6 0.1273
0.7 0.1441
0.8 0.1600
0.9 0.1750
1 0.1892
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
Whereas the graph is:
FIGURE 1 HERE
If we want to do a comparision using diﬀerent values of α :
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⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
µ τ∗α=0.2 τ
∗
α=0.3 τ
∗
α=0.4
0.1 0.0276 0.0250 0.0240
0.2 0.0533 0.0483 0.0462
0.3 0.0774 0.0700 0.0667
0.4 0.1000 0.0903 0.0857
0.5 0.1212 0.1094 0.1034
0.6 0.1412 0.1273 0.1200
0.7 0.1600 0.1441 0.1355
0.8 0.1778 0.1600 0.1500
0.9 0.1946 0.1750 0.1636
1 0.2105 0.1892 0.1765
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
3.5.3 Assuming β, γ 6= 1
In that case, the maximization leads to:
τ∗ =
γµ(1− α)
1 + βα+ γ + µγ
(27)
from which we can see that if optimal taxation increases with the degree of
altruism, in fact:
∂τ∗
∂γ
=
µ(1− α)(1 + βα)
[1 + βα+ γ + µγ]2
> 0 (28)
3.5.4 Assuming β = 1and γ 6= 1
In that case:
τ∗ =
γµ(1− α)
1 + α+ γ + µγ
(29)
3.5.5 Optimal rate of growth
Let us retain the assumption of one tax rate on labour.
Then equation (21) becomes:
g =
γ
(1 + β + γ)(1 + n)2
(1 + r)(1− τ)wtEµh1−µt (30)
which, plugging in the previous expressions and the optimal tax rate (24),
we get an expression for the optimal rate of growth:
g =
µ
µ(1− α)
α+ µ+ 2
¶µµ α(1 + µ) + 2
(α+ µ+ 2)(1 + β + γ)
¶α(1+µ)
1−α
(1−α)
µ+α
1−α (β + γ)
α(2+µ)−1
1−α
αγ
(1 + n)2
A
1+µ
1−αht
(31)
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3.5.6 Welfare analysis with two tax rate
Now we consider, as in the original setting in the first part of the paper, the
existence of both tax rates, τwand τk.
Maximization problem is now:
max
τk,τw
ln ct,t + β ln ct,t+1 + γ lnht+1 (32)
s.t.
E = τwwtht + τkrtst
ct =
µ
1
1 + β + γ
¶
(1− τw)wtht
ct+1 =
β
1 + β + γ
(1 + (1− τk)r)(1− τw)wtht
ht+1 =
γ
(1 + β + γ)
(1− τw)wtEµ(1 + (1− τk)r) h2−µt
The problem reduces to:
max
τk,τw
U =
1
1− α ln(1− τw) + β
∙
ln(1− τk) +
α
1− α ln(1− τw)
¸
+ (33)
+γ
∙
α(1 + µ)
1− α ln(1− τw) + ln(1− τk) + µ ln
µ
τw + τk
α
1− α
¶¸
As we did in the one-tax case,let us assume for simplicity that β = γ = 1,so
(33) becomes:
U =
µ
1 + 2α+ αµ
1− α
¶
ln(1− τw)+2 ln(1− τk)+µ ln
µ
τw + τk
α
1− α
¶
(34)
Let us first maximize wrt τw :
τ∗w =
−α(1 + α(2 + µ))
µ(1− α) + α(1− 2α) + 1τk +
µ(1− α)2
µ(1− α) + α(1− 2α) + 1 (35)
And then wrt τk :
τ∗k =
−2(1− α)
α(2 + µ)
τw +
µα
α(2 + µ)
(36)
In both cases there is a negative relationship between tax rates, so the reac-
tion functions are both negatively sloped. The system is thus:
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τ∗w =
−α(1 + α(2 + µ))
µ(1− α) + α(1− 2α) + 1τk +
µ(1− α)2
µ(1− α) + α(1− 2α) + 1 (37)
τ∗k =
−2(1− α)
α(2 + µ)
τw +
µα
α(2 + µ)
The "Nash solution" is:
τ∗w =
−2µα+ 2− 5α+ µ
(1− α)(µ+ 3) (38)
τ∗k =
µ2α+ 7µα+ 10α− 2µ− 4
α(2 + µ)(µ+ 3)
(39)
Some quantitative simulations on τw:⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
µ τ∗w,α=0.2 τ
∗
w,α=0.3 τ
∗
w,α=0.4
0.1 0.4274 0.2488 0.0108
0.2 0.4375 0.2589 0.0208
0.3 0.4470 0.2684 0.0303
0.4 0.4559 0.2773 0.0392
0.5 0.4643 0.2857 0.0476
0.6 0.4722 0.2937 0.0556
0.7 0.4797 0.3012 0.0631
0.8 0.4868 0.3083 0.0702
0.9 0.4936 0.3150 0.0769
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
Summary 1 Proposition 2 In a Nash-setting, the tax rate on labour is al-
ways positive.
Proof. Take (38):
τ∗w > 0 if −2µα+ 2− 5α+ µ > 0
−2µα+ µ > 5α− 2
µ(1− 2α) > 5α− 2
If α < 1/2
µ > 5α−21−2α
For 0 < α < 1 this is always satisfied.
Proposition 3 In a Nash-setting, the tax rate on capital is positive for plausible
values of parameters α and µ.
Proof. Take (39):
τ∗k > 0 if µ
2α+ 7µα+ 10α− 2µ− 4 > 0
It looks like τ∗k is positive for plausible values of α and µ.
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⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
µ τ∗k(α = 0.3) τ
∗
k(α = 0.35) τ
∗
k(α = 0.4)
0.1 −0.98 −0.45 0.08
0.2 −0.96 −0.39 0.17
0.3 −0.94 −0.33 0.27
0.4 −0.91 −0.26 0.38
0.5 −0.87 −0.18 0.50
0.6 −0.83 −0.10 0.62
0.7 −0.78 −0.01 0.75
0.8 −0.72 0.08 0.89
0.9 −0.66 0.18 1.04
1 −0.60 0.3 1.2
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
For α = 0.3 no value of µ satisfies the equation.
For α = 0.4 all values of µ satisfy the equation (so τ∗k > 0).
For α = 0.35 µ has to be greater than 0.8.
To evaluate welfare, plug (38) and (39) into the social welfare function to
get:
U =
µ
1 + 2α+ αµ
1− α
¶
ln
µ
µα+ 2α+ 1
(1− α)(µ+ 3)
¶
+2 ln
µ
2(1− α)
α(µ+ 3)
¶
+µ ln
µ
µ(1− α)(µ+ 2) + 8
(µ+ 2) (µ+ 3)(1− α)
¶
(40)
4 Conclusions
This paper attempted to analyse the problem of optimal fiscal policy in an
endogenous growth model by enriching the microfoundation of the model it-
self; in order to do so, we built a three-period overlapping generation model in
which accumulation of human capital depends on private investment in educa-
tion (the bequest left by the oldest generation to young people), human capital
of the previous generation (following empirical evidence) and public investment
in education (financed by taxation on labour and capital). Welfare analysis is
conducted both with one and then two tax rates, and in either case our findings
are that optimal taxation in production factors, for plausible values of structural
parameters is no longer zero.
Possible extensions of this work include the insertion of endogenous labour
supply and more detailed analysis of human capital accumulation that over-
comes the ad-hoc assumption of the current functional form. Moreover, we
would like to develop a richer demographic structure, capable to reproduce
more eﬃciently stylized facts in advanced countries, which are currently observ-
ing aging population with increasing pressure on welfare states and growth.
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7 Appendix A
7.1 Social planner problem with one tax rate
Utility function is:
Ut = ln ct,t + β ln ct,t+1 + γ lnht+1 (A1)
Optimal choice of ct, ct+1, ht+1 are:
ct =
µ
1
1 + β + γ
¶
(1− τw)wtht (A2)
ct+1 =
β
1 + β + γ
(1 + r)(1− τw)wtht (A3)
ht+1 =
γ
(1 + β + γ)
(1− τw)wtEµ(1 + r) h2−µt (A4)
Exploiting government balanced budget constraint E = τWh, equation (A4)
becomes:
ht+1 =
γ
(1 + β + γ)
(1− τw)wt(τWh)µ(1 + r) h2−µt (A5)
From firms’FOC:
1 + r = αAkα−1t (A6)
w = (1− α)Akα (A7)
From maximization we also know that:
kt =
Kt
ht
=
st
ht
=
β + γ
1 + β + γ
(1− τ)wt (A8)
Put (A8) into (A7):
w =
∙
(1− α)A
µ
β + γ
1 + β + γ
¶α
(1− τ)α
¸ 1
1−α
(A9)
Put (A9) and (A8) into (A6):
1 + r =
α³
β+γ
1+β+γ
´
(1− τ)(1− α)
(A10)
So the relevant logarithms (considering that we are maximizing w.r.t. τ ,so
we need to drag along only those terms) of (A9) and (A10) are:
lnw =
α
1− α ln(1− τ) (A11)
18
ln(1 + r) = − ln(1− τ) (A12)
From (A2),(A3), (A4), the relevant logarithms for maximization turn out to
be:
ln ct = ln(1− τ) + lnw (A13)
ln ct+1 = ln(1 + r) + ln(1− τ) + lnw (A14)
lnht+1 = ln(1− τ) + lnw + µ[ln τ + lnw] + ln(1 + r) (A15)
Using (A11) and (A12):
ln ct = ln(1− τ) +
α
1− α ln(1− τ) (A16)
ln ct+1 =
α
1− α ln(1− τ) (A17)
lnht+1 = ln(1− τ) +
α
1− α ln(1− τ) + µ ln τ + µ
α
1− α ln(1− τ) (A18)
Putting (A16), (A17), (A18) into (A1):
U =
1
1− α ln(1−τ) +β
∙
α
1− α ln(1− τ)
¸
+γ
∙
1
1− α ln(1− τ) + µ ln τ + µ
α
1− α ln(1− τ)
¸
(A19)
which is the social welfare function after substitution of the constraints.
8 Appendix B
8.1 Social planner problem with two tax rates
Utility function is always:
Ut = ln ct,t + β ln ct,t+1 + γ lnht+1 (B1)
Optimal choices of ct, ct+1, ht+1 are:
ct =
µ
1
1 + β + γ
¶
(1− τw)wtht (B2)
ct+1 =
β
1 + β + γ
(1 + (1− τk)r)(1− τw)wtht (B3)
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ht+1 =
γ
(1 + β + γ)
(1− τw)wtEµ(1 + (1− τk)r) h2−µt (B4)
Exploiting government balanced budget constraint E = τwwtht + τkrtst,
equation (B4) becomes:
ht+1 =
γ
(1 + β + γ)
(1− τw)wt(τwWh+ τkrtst)µ(1 + (1− τk)r) h2−µt (B5)
From firms’FOC:
r = αAkα−1t (B6)
w = (1− α)Akα (B7)
From maximization we also know that:
kt =
Kt
ht
=
st
ht
=
β + γ
1 + β + γ
(1− τw)wt (B8)
Put (B8) into (B7):
w =
∙
(1− α)A
µ
β + γ
1 + β + γ
¶α
(1− τw)α
¸ 1
1−α
(B9)
Put (B9) and (B8) into (B6):
r =
α³
β+γ
1+β+γ
´
(1− τw)(1− α)
(B10)
With the capital taxation, it becomes:
1 + (1− τk)r = 1 + (1− τk)
α³
β+γ
1+β+γ
´
(1− τw)(1− α)
(B11)
So the relevant logarithms (considering that we are maximizing w.r.t. τ ,so
we need to drag along only those terms) of (B9) and (B10) are:
lnw =
α
1− α ln(1− τw) (B12)
ln[1 + (1− τk)r] = ln(1− τk)− ln(1− τw) (B13)
From (B2), (B3), (B4), the relevant logarithms for maximization turn out
to be:
ln ct = ln(1− τw) + lnw (B14)
ln ct+1 = ln(1 + (1− τk)r) + ln(1− τw) + lnw (B15)
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lnht+1 = ln(1− τw) + lnw + µ ln[τwwh+ τkrs] + ln(1 + (1− τk)r) (B16)
Using (B12) and (B13):
ln ct =
1
1− α ln(1− τw) (B17)
ln ct+1 = ln(1− τk) +
α
1− α ln(1− τw) (B18)
lnht+1 =
α
1− α ln(1− τw) + ln(1− τk) + µ ln[τwwh+ τkrs] (B19)
Let us take the term µ ln[τwwh + τkrs] and further expand it by plugging
the optimal expression for r and s :
µ ln[τwwh+ τkrs] = µ ln[τwwh+ τk
α³
β+γ
1+β+γ
´
(1− τw)(1− α)
(β + γ)
1 + β + γ
(1− τw)wtht
µ ln[τwwh+ τkrs] = µ ln[τwwh+ τk
α
1− αwh]
µ ln[τwwh+ τkrs] = µ ln[wh(τw + τk
α
1− α ]
µ ln[τwwh+ τkrs] = µ lnwh+ µ ln
µ
τw + τk
α
1− α
¶
µ ln[τwwh+ τkrs] = µ lnw + µ lnh+ µ ln
µ
τw + τk
α
1− α
¶
µ ln[τwwh+ τkrs] = µ
α
1− α ln(1− τw) + µ ln
µ
τw + τk
α
1− α
¶
Putting it into (B19):
lnht+1 =
α(1 + µ)
1− α ln(1− τw) + ln(1− τk) + µ ln
µ
τw + τk
α
1− α
¶
(B20)
And plugging (B17), (B18),and (B20) into (B1):
U =
1
1− α ln(1− τw) + β
∙
ln(1− τk) +
α
1− α ln(1− τw)
¸
+ (41)
γ
∙
α(1 + µ)
1− α ln(1− τw) + ln(1− τk) + µ ln
µ
τw + τk
α
1− α
¶¸
which is the social welfare function after substitution of the constraints.
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